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Abstract
Background. Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of social coalitions and
alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) and their impact on individual power. Understanding the dynamics of
alliance formation and its consequences for biological, social, and cultural evolution is a formidable theoretical
challenge. In most great ape species, coalitions occur at individual and group levels and among both kin and non-
kin. Nonetheless, ape societies remain essentially hierarchical, and coalitions rarely weaken social inequality.
In contrast, human hunter-gatherers show a remarkable tendency to egalitarianism, and human coalitions and
alliances occur not only among individuals and groups, but also among groups of groups. These observations
suggest that the evolutionary dynamics of human coalitions can only be understood in the context of social
networks and cognitive evolution.
Methodology/Principal Findings. Here, we develop a stochastic model describing the emergence of net-
works of allies resulting from within-group competition for status or mates between individuals utilizing dyadic
information. The model shows that alliances often emerge in a phase transition-like fashion if the group size,
awareness, aggressiveness, and persuasiveness of individuals are large and the decay rate of individual affinities
is small. With cultural inheritance of social networks, a single leveling alliance including all group members can
emerge in several generations.
Conclusions/Significance. We propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for studying the dynamics
of alliance emergence applicable where game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our approach is both scalable
and expandable. It is scalable in that it can be generalized to larger groups, or groups of groups. It is expandable
in that it allows for inclusion of additional factors such as behavioral, genetic, social, and cultural features.
Our results suggest that a rapid transition from a hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of
hunter-gatherers (often referred to as “egalitarian revolution”) could indeed follow an increase in human cognitive
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abilities. The establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances creates conditions promoting the origin of
cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals.
keywords: coalition — alliance — social — network — egalitarian
Introduction
Coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) are often observed in a number of mammals including hye-
nas, wolves, lions, cheetahs, coatis, meerkats, and dolphins (1). In primates, both kin and non-kin, and both
within-group and group-level coalitions are a very powerful means of achieving increased reproductive success
via increased dominance status and access to mates and other resources (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). In humans, coalitions
occurs at many different levels (ranging from within-family to between-nation states) and represent probably the
most dominant factor in social interactions that has shaped human history (8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15).
The evolutionary forces emerging from coalitionary interactions may have been extremely important for the
origin of our “uniquely unique” species (16, 17). For example, it has been argued that the evolution of human brain
size and intelligence during Pleistocene was largely driven by selective forces arising from intense competition
between individuals for increased social and reproductive success (the “social brain” hypothesis, also known as the
“Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis; (16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27)). Coalition formation is
one of the most powerful strategies in competitive interactions and thus it should have been an important ingredient
of selective forces acting in early humans. Moreover, one can view language as a tool that originally emerged for
simplifying the formation and improving the efficiency of coalitions and alliances. It has also been argued that
the establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances in early human groups should have created conditions
promoting the origin of conscience, moralistic aggression, altruism, and other norms favoring the group interests
over those of individuals (28). Increasing within-group cohesion should also promote the group efficiency in
between-group conflicts (29, 30) and intensify cultural group selection (31).
In spite of their importance for biological, social and cultural evolution, our understanding of how coalitions
and alliances are formed, maintained and break down is limited. Existing theoretical approaches for studying
coalitions in animals are deeply rooted in cooperative game theory, economics, and operations research (32, 33,
34, 35). These approaches are usually limited by consideration of coalitions of two individuals against one, focus
on conditions under which certain coalitions are successful and/or profitable and assume (implicitly or explicitly)
that individuals are able to evaluate these conditions and join freely coalitions that maximize their success (36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44). As such, they typically do not capture the dynamic nature of coalitions and/or are
not directly applicable to individuals lacking the abilities to enter into binding agreements and to obtain, process,
and use complex information on costs, benefits, and consequences of different actions involving multiple parties
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(45). These approaches do not account for the effects of friendship and the memory of past events and acts which
all are important in coalition formation and maintenance. Other studies emphasize the importance of Prisoner’s
Dilemma as a paradigm for the emergence of cooperative behavior in groups engaged in the public goods game
(46, 47). These studies have been highly successful in identifying conditions that favor the evolution of cooperation
among unrelated individuals in the face of incentives to cheat. Prisoner’s Dilemma however is often not appropriate
for studying coalitionary behavior (48, 49) especially when individuals cooperate to compete directly with other
individuals or coalitions (16, 17) and within-coalition interactions are mutualistic rather than altruistic and the
benefit of cooperation is immediate. The social network dynamics that result from coalition formation remain
largely unexplored.
Here, we propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for studying the dynamics of alliance emergence
applicable where game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our method is related to recent models of social
network formation and games on graphs with dynamic linking (50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55). In our novel approach,
alliances are defined in a natural way (via affinity matrices; see below) and emerge from low-level processes.
The approach is both scalable and expandable. It is scalable in that it can be generalized to larger groups, or
groups of groups, and potentially applied to modeling the origin and evolution of states (11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 56,
57). It is expandable in that it allows for inclusion of additional factors such as behavioral, genetic, social, and
cultural features. One particular application of our approach is an analysis of conditions under which intense
competition for a limiting resource between individuals with intrinsically different fighting abilities could lead to
the emergence of a single leveling alliance including all members of the group. This application is relevant with
regard to recent discussions of “egalitarian revolution” (i.e. a rapid transition from a hierarchical society of great
apes to an egalitarian society of human hunter-gatherers, (10)), and whether it could have been triggered by an
increase in human cognitive abilities (16, 17).
Model
We consider a group of N individuals continuously engaged in competition for status and/or access to a limited
resource. Individuals differ with regard to their fighting abilities si (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). The attitude of individual
i to individual j is described by a variable xij which we call affinity. We allow for both positive and negative
affinities. Individual affinities control the probabilities of getting coalitionary support (see below). The group state
is characterized by an N ×N matrix with elements xij which we will call the affinity matrix.
Time is continuous. Below we say that an event occurs at rate r if the probability of this event during a short
time interval dt is rdt.
We assume that each individual gets engaged in a conflict with another randomly chosen individual at rate α
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which we treat as a constant for simplicity. Each other member of the group is aware of the conflict with a constant
probability ω. Each individual, say individual k, aware of a conflict between individuals i and j (“initiators”),
evaluates a randomly chosen initiator of a conflict, say, individual i, and helps him or not with probabilities hki
and 1− hki, respectively. In the latter case, individual k then evaluates the other initiator of the conflict and helps
him or not with probabilities hkj and 1 − hkj , respectively. We note that the coalitionary support may be vocal
rather than physical (58). Below we will graphically illustrate the group state using matrices with elements hij
which we will call interference matrices.
The interference probabilities hij are given by an S-shaped function of affinity xij and are scaled by two pa-
rameters: β and η. A baseline interference rate β controls the probability of interference on behalf of an individual
the affinity towards whom is zero; β can be viewed as a measure of individual aggressiveness (i.e., the readiness to
interfere in a conflict) or persuasiveness (i.e., the ability to attract help). A slope parameter η controls how rapidly
the probability of interference increases with affinity. In numerical simulations we will use function
hki =
[
1 +
1− β
β
exp(−ηxki)
]−1
.
Note that the probability of help hij changes from 0 to β to 1 as affinity xij changes from large negative values to
zero to large positive values.
For simplicity, we assume that interference decisions are not affected by who else is interfering and on which
side. We also assume that individuals join coalitions without regard to their probability of winning. This assump-
tion is sensible as a first step because predicting the outcomes of conflicts involving multiple participants and
changing alliances would be very challenging for apes and hunter-gatherers.
As a result of interference, an initially dyadic conflict may transform into a conflict between two coalitions.
[Here, coalition is a group of individuals on the same side of a particular conflict.] The fighting ability SI of a
coalition I with n participants is defined as snn2, where sn is the average fighting ability of the participants. This
formulation follows the classical Lanchester-Osipov square law (59, 60, 61) which captures a larger importance of
the size of the coalition over the individual strengths of its participants. The probability that coalition I prevails
over coalition J is SI/(SI + SJ ).
Following a conflict resolution we update the affinities of all parties involved by a process analogous to rein-
forcement learning (62). The affinities of winners are changed by δww, of the losers by δll, the affinities of winners
to losers by δwl, and those of losers to winners by δlw. The δ-values reflect the effects of the costs and benefits
of interference on future actions. It is natural to assume that the affinities of winners increase (δww > 0) and
those of antagonists decrease (δwl < 0, δlw < 0). The change in the affinities of losers δll can be of either sign
or zero. Parameters δww, δwl, δlw and δll are considered to be constant. We note that a negative impact of costs
of interfering in a conflict on the probability of future interferences can be captured by additionally reducing all
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Table 1: Main dinamic variables, parameters, and other variables, functions, and statistics.
xij affinity of individual i to individual j
N group size
si fighting ability of individual i
α conflict initiation rate
ω awareness
β baseline interference rate
η slope parameter
δww, δwl, δlw, δll changes in affinity after conflict resolution
µ affinity decay rate
κ strength of social network inheritance
γ birth rate
hij probability that individual i helps individual j; is given by
an S-shaped function of affinity with parameters β and η
SI = sn
2 strength of coalition I with n members and average fighting ability s
SI/(SI + SJ) probability that coalition I wins a conflict with coalition J
Xi proportion of conflicts won by individual i since birth
Yi =
∑
k bk/Ai expected social success of individual i; Ai is the age
of individual i and bk is the benefit of the kth conflict
HX , HY standard deviations of Xi and Yi in the group (measures of inequality)
C(1), C(2), h clustering coefficients and the average probability of help in an alliance
affinities between members of a coalition by a fixed value δ.
We assume that coalitions are formed and conflicts are resolved on a time-scale much faster than that of conflict
initiation. Finally, to reflect a reduced importance of past events relative to more recent events in controlling one’s
affinities, affinities decay towards 0 at a constant rate µ (63). Table 1 summarizes our notaion.
Results and Their Biological Interpretation
To gain intuition about the model’s behavior we ran numerical simulations with all affinities initially zero. We
analyzed the structure of the interference matrix hij , looking for emerging alliances. We say individuals i and j
are allies if their interference probabilities hij and hji both exceed the baseline interference rate β by at least 50%.
An alliance is a connected network of allies.
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We also measured a number of statistics including the average and variance of affinities, the proportion of
individuals who belong to an alliance, the number and sizes of alliances, the clustering coefficients C(1) and C(2)
(64), related to the probability that two allies of an individual are themselves allies. The average interference
probability and the clustering coefficients can be interpreted as measuring the “strength” of alliances.
To make interpretation of model dynamics easier, we computed the proportionXi of conflicts won since birth,
and the expected social success Yi =
∑
k bk/Ai, where Ai is the age of individual i, the sum is over all conflicts
k he has participated in, the benefit bk is 1/nk if i was a member of a winning coalition of nk individuals, and
bk is 0 if i was on the losing side. Although in our model the probability of winning always increases with the
coalition size, the benefit bk always decreases with the coalition size. The net effect of the alliance size on the
expected benefits of its members will depend on the sizes and composition of all alliances in the group. Note that
our interpretation of Yi as a measure of expected social success makes sense both if all members on the winning
side share equally the reward or if the spoils of each particular conflict goes to a randomly chosen member of the
winning coalition. The former may be the case when the reward is an increase in status or rank. The latter may
correspond to situations similar to those in baboons fighting over females, where members of the winning coalition
may race to the female and whoever reaches her first becomes the undisputed consort for some time (48). Nonequal
sharing of benefits can be incorporated in the model in a straightforward way. Note also that being a member of a
losing coalition always reduces relative social success.
We also calculated the standard deviations HX and HY of Xi and Yi values. These statistics measure the
degree of “social inequality” in the group.
Figure 1 illustrates some coalitionary regimes observed in simulations using a default set of parameters (α =
1, β = 0.05, δww = 1, δll = 0.5, δwl = −0.5, δlw = −0.5, η = 0.5, ω = 0.5, µa = 0.05) unless noted otherwise.
This figure shows the N × N interference matrices using small squares arranged in an N × N array with each
of the squares color-coding for the corresponding value of hij using the gray scale. The squares on the diagonal
are painted black for convenience. In all examples, individual strengths si are chosen randomly and independently
from a uniform distribution on [0, 10] resulting in strong between-individual variation.
Emergence of alliances. In our model, the affinity between any two individuals is reinforced if they are on
a winning side of a conflict and is decreased if they are on the opposite sides; all affinities also decay to zero
at a constant rate. The resulting state represents a balance between factors increasing and decreasing affinities.
Although the emergence of alliances is in no way automatic, simulations show that under certain conditions they
do emerge. The size, strength, and temporal stability of alliances depend on parameters and may vary dramatically
from one run to another even with the same parameters. However, once one or more alliances with high values
of C(1), C(2) and h are formed, they are typically stable. Individuals belonging to the same alliance have very
similar social success which is only weakly correlated with their fighting abilities. That is, the social success is
6
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 1: Interference matrices at time 1000. Values of hij are gray-scale coded from 0 (white) to 1 (black), with diagonal
elements set to black. The smallest squares on the diagonal represent unaffiliated individuals. For display purposes, alliances are
ordered according to their clustering coefficients C(1) so that stronger alliances occur first along the diagonal. Parameters have
default values except where noted. (a) N = 10. (b) N = 20. (c) N = 30. (d) N = 20, δll = −0.5. (e) N = 20, µ = 0.1.
(f) N = 20, ω = 0.25.
now defined not by the individual?s fighting ability but by the size and strength of the alliance he belongs to.
Individuals from different alliances can have vastly different social success, so that the formation of coalitions and
alliances does not necessarily reduce social inequality in the group as a whole.
Phase transition. We performed a detailed numerical study of the effects of individual parameters of the prop-
erties of the system. As expected, increasing the frequency of interactions (which can be achieved by increasing
the group size N , the awareness probability ω, baseline interference rate β, or the slope parameter η) and reducing
the affinity decay rate µ all promote alliance formation. Most interestingly, some characteristics change in a phase
transition-like pattern as some parameters undergo small changes. For example, Figure 2 show that increasing
N,ω, β, η, or decreasing µ result in a sudden transition from no alliances to at least one very strong alliance with
all members always supporting each other. Parameter δll has a similar but less extreme effect, whereas parameters
δwl and δlw have relatively weak effects (Supplementary Information). Similar threshold-like behavior is exhibited
by the C(2)-measure, the average probability of help h within the largest alliance, the number of alliances, and the
numbers of alliances with C(1) > 0.5 and with h > 0.5 (Supplementary Information). Interestingly, formation of
multiple alliances is hindered when affinities between individuals fighting on the same side decrease as a result of
losing (i.e., if δll < 0).
Cultural inheritance of social networks. Next, we extended the model to larger temporal scales by allowing
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Figure 2: Tukey plots for the effects of N,ω, β, η, µ, δll on the C(1) measure of the largest alliance. Each graph shows
the effect of changing a single parameter from its default value (results for each parameter value are averaged over 20 runs,
using data from time 1000 to 2000). The vertical lines extend from minimum to maximum observations, the dashed lines depict
averages, and the boxes extend from lower to upper quartiles.
for birth/death events, and the cultural inheritance of social networks. New individuals are born at a constant rate γ.
Each birth causes the death of a different randomly chosen individual. We explored two rather different scenarios
of cultural inheritance. In the first, the offspring inherits the social network of its parent who is chosen among all
individuals with a probability proportional to the rate of social success Yi. This scenario requires special social
bonds between parents and offspring. In the second, each new individual inherits affinities of its “role model”
(chosen from the whole group either with a uniform probability or with a probability proportional to the rate of
social success Yi). Under both scenarios, if individual i∗ is an offspring (biological in the first scenario or cultural
in the second scenario) of individual i, then we set xi∗j = κxij for each other individual j in the group (parameter
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 controls the strength of social network inheritance). In the parent-offspring case, the affinities of other
individuals to the son are proportional to those to the father: xji∗ = κxji and xi∗i = xii∗ is set to κ times the
maximum existing affinity in the group. In the role model case, other individuals initially have zero affinities to
the new member of the group: xji∗ = 0.
Stochastic equilibrium. If cultural inheritance of social networks is weak (κ is small), a small number of
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t = 1000 t = 2000 t = 3000 t = 4000 t = 5000 t = 6000 t = 7000 t = 8000 t = 9000 t = 10000
t = 11000 t = 12000 t = 13000 t = 14000 t = 15000 t = 16000 t = 17000 t = 18000 t = 19000 t = 20000
Figure 3: Dynamics of interference matrix; no cultural inheritance (κ = 0). Parameters values are default with N = 20
and γ = 0.001 (average life span 1000). See the legend of Fig.1.
alliances are maintained across generations in stochastic equilibrium (see Figure 3). This happens because the
death of individuals tends to decrease the size of existing alliances while new individuals are initially unaffiliated
and may form new affinities. This regime is similar to coalitionary structures recently identified in a community of
wild chimpanzees in Uganda (6) and in populations of bottlenose dolphins in coastal waters of Western Australia
(65) and eastern Scotland (66).
Egalitarian state. If cultural inheritance of social networks is faithful (κ is large), the dynamics become
dramatically different due to intense selection between different alliances. Now the turnover of individuals creates
conditions for growth of alliances. Larger alliances increase in size as a result of their members winning more
conflicts, achieving higher social success, and parenting (biologically or culturally) more offspring who themselves
become members of the paternal alliance. As a result of this positive feedback loop (analogous to that of positive
frequency-dependent selection), the system exhibits a strong tendency towards approaching a state in which all
members of the group belong to the same alliance and have very similar social success in spite of strong variation
in their fighting abilities. Figure 4 contrasts the egalitarian state with the stochastic equilibrium illustrated in Figure
3 above. One can see that at the egalitarian state, the average affinity is increased while the standard deviation of
affinity and the hierarchy measures are decreased. Although at the egalitarian state the correlation of individual
strength and social success can be substantial, it does not result in social inequality. This “egalitarian” state can be
reached in several generations.
Cycling. However, the egalitarian state is not always stable. Under certain conditions the system continuously
goes through cycles of increased and decreased cohesion (Figure 5a-c) in which the egalitarian state is gradually
approached as one alliance eventually excludes all others. But once the egalitarian state is established (in Figure 5d,
around time 5200), it quickly disintegrates because of internal conflicts between members of the winning alliance.
Figure 5d illustrates one such cycle, showing that the dominant alliance remains relatively stable as long as the
group excludes at least one member (“outsider”).
Analytical approaches. Simple “mean-field” approximations help to understand model dynamics. These ap-
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Figure 4: Contrasting a state with a small number of alliances maintained in stochastic equilibrium with an
egalitarian state. The left column of graphs correspond to the run shown in Figure 3 which resulted in a small
number of alliances maintained in stochastic equilibrium. The right column of graphs correspond to a run with
κ = 1 (complete cultural inheritance of social network) and µ = 0.025 (increased memory of past events) which
resulted in an egalitarian regime. With several alliances present simultaneously (left graphs), the average affinity is
small, the variance of affinities is large, the measures of social inequality Hx and Hy are large, and the correlation
between social success Yi and individual fighting ability si is small. In the egalitarian state (right graphs), the
average affinity is large, the variance of affinities is small, the measures of social inequality Hx and Hy are small,
and the correlation between social success Yi and individual fighting ability si is large.
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Figure 5: A coalitionary cycle; complete cultural inheritance (κ = 1). Other parameters are as in Figure 3. (a) Average
(blue) and standard deviation (red) of affinities. (b) Number of alliances (blue) and clustering coefficient C1 for the largest
alliance (red). (c) Proportions of individuals belonging to an alliance (red) and to the largest alliance (blue). (d) Dynamics of
the interference matrix between time 4100 and 7200.
proximations focus on the average a and variance v of affinities computed over particular coalitions (Supplemen-
tary Information). For example, at an egalitarian state when all individuals have very high affinity to each other, the
dynamics of a and v are predicted to evolve to particular stochastic equilibrium values, a∗ and v∗. The egalitarian
state is stable if the fluctuations of pairwise affinities around a∗ do not result in negative affinities. We conjecture
that the egalitarian state is stable if a∗ > 3
√
v∗, which is roughly equivalent to (a∗)2 > 10v∗, which can be
rewritten as
2αNω2
µ
> 10
(
var δ
δ
2 + 1− ω2
)
.
Here the mean δ and variance var δ are computed over the four δ-coefficients. Both the approximations and numer-
ical simulations suggest that the egalitarian state cannot be stable with negative δ. Increasing the population size
N , awareness ω, average δ, and decreasing the affinity decay rate µ and variance var δ all promote stability of the
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egalitarian state. The agreement of numerical simulations with analytical approximations is very good given the
stochastic nature of the process. Similar approximations can be developed for other regimes. In particular, one can
show (Supplementary Information) that the stabilizing effect of “outsiders” on the persistence of alliances is espe-
cially strong in small groups. This happens because successful conflicts against outsiders simultaneously increase
the average a and decrease the variance v of the within-alliance affinities, with both effects being proportional to
1/N .
Discussion
The overall goal of this paper was to develop a flexible theoretical framework for describing the emergence of
alliances of individuals able to overcome the power of alpha-types in a population and to study the dynamics and
consequences of these processes. We considered a group of individuals competing for rank and/or some limiting
resource (e.g., mates). We assumed that individuals varied strongly in their fighting abilities. If all conflicts
were exclusively dyadic, a hierarchy would emerge with a few strongest individuals getting most of the resource
(67, 68, 69, 70). However there is also a tendency (very small initially) for individuals to interfere in an ongoing
dyadic conflict thus biasing its outcome one way or another. Positive outcomes of such interferences increase the
affinities between individuals while negative outcomes decrease them. Using a minimum set of assumptions about
cognitive abilities of individuals, we looked for conditions under which long-lasting coalitions (i.e. alliances)
emerge in the group. We showed that such an outcome is promoted by increasing the frequency of interactions
(which can be achieved in a number of ways) and decreasing the affinity decay rate. Most interestingly, the model
shows that the shift from a state with no alliances to one or more alliances typically occurs in a phase-transition
like fashion. Even more surprisingly, under certain conditions (that include some cultural inheritance of social
networks) a single alliance comprising all members of the group can emerge in which the resource is divided
evenly. That is, the competition among nonequal individuals can paradoxically result in their eventual equality.
We emphasize that in our model, egalitarianism emerges from political dynamics of intense competition between
individuals for higher social and reproductive success rather than by environmental constraints, social structure, or
cultural processes. In other words, within-group conflicts promote the buildup of a group-level alliance. In a sense,
once alliances start to form, there is no other reasonable strategy but to join one, and once social networks become
highly heritable, a single alliance including all group members is destined to emerge.
Few clarifications are in order. First, in our model coalitionary interactions are mutualistic in nature rather
than altruistic. We note that there are not many examples of truly altruistic behavior outside of humans (45) with
some of those that were initially suggested to be altruistic under closer examination turning out to be kin-directed
or mutualistic (45, 71). Even in humans certain behaviors that are viewed as altruistic may have a rather different
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origin. For example, food sharing may have originated as a way to avoid harassment, e.g. in the form of begging
(45). In any case, modern human behavior is strongly shaped by evolved culture (31) and might not be a good
indicator of factors acting during its origin. Second, in our model we avoided the crucial step of the dominant
game-theoretic paradigm which is an explicit evaluation of costs and benefits of certain actions in controlling one’s
decisions. In our model, coalitions and alliances emerge from simple processes based on individuals using only
limited “local” information (i.e., information on own affinities but not on other individuals’ affinities) rather than
as a solution to an optimization task. Our approach is justified not only by its mathematical simplicity but by
biological realism as well. Indeed, solving the cost-benefit optimization tasks (which require rather sophisticated
algebra in modern game-theoretic models) would be very difficult for apes and early humans (45) especially given
the multiplicity of behavioral choices and the dynamic nature of coalitions. Therefore treating coalitions and
alliances in early human groups as an emergent property rather than an optimization task solution appears to
be a much more realistic approach. We note that costs and benefits can be incorporated in our approach in a
straightforward manner. Third, one should be careful in applying our model to contemporary humans (whether
members of modern societies or hunter-gathers). In contemporary humans, an individual’s decision on joining
coalitions will be strongly affected by his/her estimates of costs, benefits, and risks associated as well as by cultural
beliefs and traditions. These are the factors explicitly left outside of our framework.
Our results have implications for a number of questions related to human social evolution. The great apes’
societies are very hierarchical; their social system is based on sharp status rivalry and depends on specific disposi-
tions for dominance and submission. A major function of coalitions in apes is to maintain or change the dominance
structure (1, 3); although leveling coalitions are sometimes observed (e.g., (2)), they are typically of small size and
short-lived. In sharp contrast, most known hunter-gatherer societies are egalitarian (8, 9, 10). Their weak leaders
merely assist a consensus-seeking process when the group needs to make decisions; at the band level, all main
political actors behave as equal. It has been argued that in egalitarian societies the pyramid of power is turned
upside down with potential subordinates being able to express dominance because they find collective security in
a large, group-wide political coalition (10). One factor that may have promoted transition to an egalitarian soci-
ety is the development of larger brains and better political/social intelligence in response to intense within-group
competition for increased social and reproductive success (16, 17, 25, 27). Our model supports these arguments.
Indeed, increased cognitive abilities would allow humans to maintain larger group sizes, have higher awareness of
ongoing conflicts, better abilities in attracting allies and building complex coalitions, and better memories of past
events. The changes in each of these characteristics may have shifted the group across the phase boundary to the
regime where the emergence of an egalitarian state becomes unavoidable. Similar effect would follow a change
in mating system that would increase father-son social bonds, or an increase in fidelity of cultural inheritance of
social networks. The fact that mother-daughter social bonds are often very strong suggests (everything else being
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the same) females could more easily achieve egalitarian societies. The establishment of a stable group-wide egal-
itarian alliance should create conditions promoting the origin of conscience, moralistic aggression, altruism, and
other cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals (28). Increasing within-group cohesion
will also promote the group efficiency in between-group conflicts (29) and intensify cultural group selection.
In humans, a secondary transition from egalitarian societies to hierarchical states took place as the first civ-
ilizations were emerging. How can it be understood in terms of the model presented here? One can speculate
that technological and cultural advances made the coalition size much less important in controlling the outcome
of a conflict than the individuals’ ability to directly control and use resources (e.g., weapons, information, food)
that strongly influence conflict outcomes. In terms of our model, this would dramatically increase the variation
in individual fighting abilities and simultaneously render the Lanchester-Osipov square law inapplicable, making
egalitarianism unstable.
Besides developing a novel and general approach for modeling coalitionary interactions and providing theoret-
ical support to some controversial verbal arguments concerning social transitions during the origin of humans, the
research presented here allows one to make a number of testable predictions. In particular, our model has identified
a number of factors (such as group size, the extent to which group members are aware of within-group conflicts,
cognitive abilities, aggressiveness, persuasiveness, existence of outsiders, and the strength of parent-offspring so-
cial bonds) which are predicted to increase the likelihood and size of alliances and affect in specific ways individual
social success and the degree of within-group inequality. Existing data on coalitions in mammals (in particular, in
dolphins and primates) and in human hunter-gatherer societies should be useful in testing these predictions and in
refining our model.
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Supporting Information
Here, we present
• some additional details on the computational methods used;
• a set of figures (Figures S1-S8) illustrating the effects of individual parameters on the coalitionary structure
of the model achieved within a single generation;
• a set of figures (Figures S9 and S10) illustrating the effects of changes in multiple parameters simultaneously
on the coalitionary structure of the model achieved within a single generation;
• an outline of a mathematical method used to study the model analytically.
Some details of computational methods
Probabilities of help For an individual k aware of a conflict between individuals i and j, the probabilities of
helping to i, to j, and of no interference are set to hki − hkihkj/2, hkj − hkihkj/2 and (1 − hki)(1 − hkj),
respectively. In numerical simulations, we set
hki =
[
1 +
1− β
β
exp(−ηxki)
]−1
,
where β and η are scaling parameters. Note that hki → 1 for xki →∞, hki → 0 for xki → −∞, and hki = β for
xki = 0.
Numerical implementation The model dynamics were simulated using Gillespie’s direct method (Gillespie
1977). That is, the next event to happen is chosen according to the corresponding rates. The time interval until the
next event is drawn from an exponential distribution with a parameter equal to the sum of the rates of all possible
events. All rates are recomputed after each event.
Reference
• Gillespie, D. T. Exact stochastic simulation of coupled chemical reactions. Journal of Physical Chemistry
81, 2340-2361 (1977)
Supplementary Figures and Legends
Figures S1-S8 To obtain Figures S1-S8 we performed 20 runs for each parameter combination. Each of the 20
runs was characterized by a single average value (computed over 100 observations taken between time 1000 to
2000). All plots correspond to the Tukey Plots (i.e. show mean, min, max, quantile 1/4 and quantile 3/4), with 20
20
data points. Other parameters were set to default values (N = 20, δww = 1, δll = 0.5, δwl = −0.5, δlw = −1, β =
0.05, µ = 0.1, η = 0.5, ω = 0.5).
Figures S9 and S10 To obtain Figures S9 and S10 we performed 40 runs for each parameter combination.
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Figure S1: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the proportion of individuals belonging to a alliance
for a default set of parameter values.
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Figure S2: Effects of parametersN, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the number of alliances for a default set of parameter
values.
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Figure S3: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the size of the biggest alliance for a default set of
parameter values.
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Figure S4: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the C(1) measure of the largest alliance for a default
set of parameter values.
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Figure S5: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the C(2) measure of the largest alliance for a default
set of parameter values.
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Figure S6: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the probability of help within of the largest alliance
for a default set of parameter values.
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Figure S7: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the number of alliances with C1 > 0.5 for a default
set of parameter values.
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Figure S8: Effects of parameters N, δll, δwl, δlw, β, µ, η, ω on the number of alliances with within-cluster proba-
bility of interference > 0.5 for a default set of parameter values.
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Figure S9: Effects of parameters N, β, µ, η, ω on the number of individuals in alliances (first column) and the size
of the largest alliance (second column) for δww = 1.0, δll = 0.5, δwl = −0.5, δlw = −1.0. First row: N = 10,
second row: N = 20, third row: N = 30.
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Figure S10: Effects of parameters N, β, µ, η, ω on the C(1) measure of the largest alliance (first column), and the
number of alliances with C(1) > 0.5 (second column) for δww = 1.0, δll = 0.5, δwl = −0.5, δlw = −1.0. First
row: N = 10, second row: N = 20, third row: N = 30.
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Supplementary Methods: Mean field approximation for the dynamics of coalitions on the
within-generation time-scale
We consider a group of N individuals in which conflicts occur at rate αN . Below we will use two types of
averages: the average over a clique (i.e., a set of individuals who all are close allies), which we will denote as 〈ξ〉,
and the average over all possible outcomes of the process, which we will denote as ξ or E(ξ), where ξ is a random
variable.
Approximate dynamics of the mean and variance of affinities near an egalitarian state. We assume that
all N individuals are close allies so that each individual aware of a conflict interferes in it. The average affinity of
the group is
〈x〉 = 1
N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
xij .
After each conflict, each affinity value changes from xij to xij + εij where εij is a random variable describing the
change in affinity of individual i to individual j. Let a = 〈x〉 be the expected average affinity. Since expectation
and averaging are linear, the expected average affinity after a conflict can be written as
a′ = 〈x+ ε〉 = a+ 〈ε〉,
All affinities continuously decay to 0 at a constant rate µ. Therefore, the dynamics of a are described by a differ-
ential equation
da
dt
= αN 〈ε〉 − µa. (S1)
Similarly, let v = 〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2 be the expectation of the variance taken over all possible outcomes of the
process. Then the variance after a conflict is
v′ = E
(
〈 (x+ ε)2〉 − 〈x + ε〉2
)
= E
(
〈x2〉+ 2〈x ε〉+ 〈ε2〉 − (〈x〉2 + 2〈x〉〈ε〉+ 〈ε〉2)2)
= E
(
〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2 + 〈ε2〉 − 〈ε〉2
)
+ 2〈x ε〉 − 2〈x〉 〈ε〉
= v + 〈ε2〉 − 〈ε〉2.
where, as an approximation, we assumed that x and ε are independent with respect to the averaging operator, i.e.,
〈x ε〉 = 〈x〉 〈ε〉.
All squares of affinities decay to 0 at a constant rate 2µ. Therefore, the dynamics of v are described by a
differential equation
dv
dt
= αN
( 〈ε2〉 − 〈ε〉2 )− 2µv. (S2)
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First, we consider the expected change 〈ε〉 in the affinity of a random pair of individuals after a conflict. There
are three possibilities:
• With probability 1/(N2 ), the two individuals are the initiators of the conflict. Since either of the two initiators
can be on the winning side, the expected change in their affinity is
δ0 =
δWL + δLW
2
.
Under our assumptions about the meaning of parameters, δ0 is negative.
• With probability
[
2(N − 2)/(N2 )]ω, one of the two individuals is an “initiator” while the other was aware
of the conflict and interfered on behalf of one side. Since there are four ways to distribute the two individuals
over the winning and losing coalitions and each occurs with equal probability, the expected change in their
affinity is
δ =
δWW + δWL + δLW + δLL
4
.
• With probability
[
1− 1/(N2 )− 2(N − 2)/(N2 )]ω2, neither individual is the initiator of the conflict but both
are aware of it and interfere in the conflict. The expected change in their affinity is δ.
Therefore,
〈ε〉 = 1(
N
2
) δ0 + 2(N − 2)(N
2
) ω δ +
(
N
2
)− 2(N − 2)− 1(
N
2
) ω2 δ (S3a)
= ω2 δ +
4(N − 2)
N(N − 1) ω(1− ω)δ +
2
N(N − 1)(δ0 − ω
2 δ). (S3b)
Then, equations (S1,S3b) predict that the average affinity in the egalitarian state evolves to an equilibrium value
a∗ =
αN
µ
[
ω2 δ +
4(N − 2)
N(N − 1) ω(1− ω)δ +
2
N(N − 1)(δ0 − ω
2 δ)
]
. (S4)
The average affinity is positive only if δ > 0. The last term in the brackets can be neglected relative to the first
term even for small groups (e.g., N ≥ 5). The second term in the brackets can be neglected for larger groups (e.g.,
N ≥ 40) if ω is not too small. Under these conditions, a∗ ≈ αN
µ
ω2 δ.
In a similar way and using the results above,
〈ε2〉 = 1(
N
2
) δ1 + 2(N − 2)(N
2
) ω δ2 +
(
N
2
)− 2(N − 2)− 1(
N
2
) ω2 δ2, (S5)
where
δ1 =
δ2WL + δ
2
LW
2
, δ2 =
δ2WW + δ
2
WL + δ
2
LW + δ
2
LL
4
.
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More involved calculations show that
〈ε〉2 = 1
N2(N − 1)2
∑
i6=j
∑
k 6=l
εijεkl (S6a)
=
1
N2(N − 1)2
∑
i6=j
(εijεij + εijεji) (S6b)
+
1
N2(N − 1)2
∑
i6=j
∑
k 6=i,j
(εijεik + εijεkj + εijεjk + εijεki) (S6c)
+
1
N2(N − 1)2
∑
i6=j
∑
k,l 6=i,j
εijεkl (S6d)
≡ 1
N(N − 1)A1 +
4(N − 2)
N(N − 1)A2 +
(N − 2)(N − 3)
N(N − 1) A3, (S6e)
where
A1 =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
(εijεij + εijεji), (S6f)
A2 =
1
4N(N − 1)(N − 2)
∑
i6=j
∑
k 6=i,j
(εijεik + εijεkj + εijεjk + εijεki), (S6g)
A3 =
1
N(N − 1)(N − 2)(N − 3)
∑
i6=j
∑
k,l 6=i,j
εijεkl. (S6h)
The term A1 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = εijεij + εijεji for a random pair of individuals
(i and j). There are three cases to consider.
• With probability 1/(N2 ), the focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict. In this case, ∆ = 2δ20 .
• With probability
[
2(N − 2)/(N2 )]ω, one of the two focal individuals is the initiator of the conflict while the
other is aware of it.
• With probability
[
1− 1/(N2 )− 2(N − 2)/(N2 )]ω2, both focal individuals are aware of the conflict. In the
last two cases, ∆ = δ20 + 2δ2 − δ1.
Therefore,
A1 =
1(
N
2
) 2δ20 +
[
2(N − 2)(
N
2
) ω +
(
N
2
)− 2(N − 2)− 1(
N
2
) ω2
]
(δ20 + 2δ2 − δ1) (S7)
The term A2 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = εijεik + εijεkj + εijεjk + εijεki for a random
triple of individuals (i, j and k). There are three cases to consider.
• With probability
[
3/
(
N
2
)]
ω, two of the three focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict while the third
is aware of it. In this case, ∆ = (8δoδ + 4δ
2
)/3.
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• With probability
[
3(N − 3)/(N2 )]ω2, one of the three focal individuals is the initiator of the conflict while
the two others are aware of it.
• With probability
[
1− 3(N − 3)/(N2 )− 3/(N2 )]ω3, none of the three focal individuals are the initiators of
the conflict but all are aware of it.
To evaluate ∆ in the last two cases, one needs to consider changes in affinities corresponding to all possible ways
to assign three individuals to the winning and losing coalitions. This is done in the table below:
winners losers εijεik εijεkj εijεjk εijεki
ijk - δ2WW δ
2
WW δ
2
WW δ
2
WW
ij k δWW δWL δWW δLW δWW δWL δWW δLW
ik j δWLδWW δ
2
WL δWLδLW δWLδWW
jk i δ2LW δLW δWW δLW δWW δLW δWL
i jk δ2WL δWLδLL δWLδLL δWLδLW
j ik δLW δLL δ
2
LW δLW δWL δLW δLL
k ij δLLδLW δLLδWL δLLδLW δLLδWL
− ijk δ2LL δ2LL δ2LL δ2LL
Using this table,
∆ =
1
8
(4δ2WW + 4δ
2
LL + 2δ
2
LW + 2δ
2
WL + 4δWW δWL + 4δWW δLW + 4δLLδLW + 4δLLδWL + 4δLW δWL)
=
1
8
[2(δWW + δLL + δLW + δWL)
2 + 2(δWW − δLL)2]
=4δ
2
+
1
4
(δWW − δLL)2.
Therefore,
A2 =
4(
N
2
)ω(2δoδ + δ2) +
[
3(N − 3)(
N
2
) ω2 +
(
N
2
)− 3(N − 3)− 3(
N
2
) ω3
]
(4δ
2
+
1
4
[
δWW − δLL)2
]
. (S8)
The term A3 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = εijεkl for a random quartet of individuals (i, j, k
and l). There are three cases to consider:
• With probability
[
6/
(
N
2
)]
ω2, two of the four focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict while the two
others are aware of it. In this case, ∆ = δ3 ≡
[
4δ20 + 3δ0(δWW + δLL) + 2δLLδWW
]
/12
• With probability
[
4(N − 4)/(N2 )]ω3, one of the four focal individuals is the initiator of the conflict while
the three others are aware of it. In this case, ∆ = δ2.
• With probability
[
1− 4(N − 4)/(N2 )− 6/(N2 )]ω4, none of the three focal individuals are the initiators of
the conflict but all are aware of it. In this case, ∆ = δ2.
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Therefore,
A3 =
1(
N
2
)ω2δ3 +
[
4(N − 4)(
N
2
) ω3 +
(
N
2
)− 4(N − 4)− 6(
N
2
) ω4
]
δ
2
. (S9)
Keeping only the leading terms in 1/N , 〈ε2ij〉 = ω2δ2, 〈εijεkl〉 = (ω2δ)2, which results in an equation for v:
dv
dt
= αNω2
[
var δ + (1 − ω2)δ2
]
− 2µv, (S10)
where var δ = δ2− δ2. Higher order corrections (in 1/N ) can be found in a straightforward way from the formula
given above.
Keeping only the leading terms in 1/N , the mean field approximation predicts the following equilibrium values
at the egalitarian regime
a∗ =
αNω2δ
µ
,
v∗ =
αNω2
[
var δ + (1− ω2)δ2
]
2µ
,
The egalitarian state is stable if the fluctuations of pairwise affinities around a∗ do not result in negative affini-
ties. We conjecture that the egalitarian state is stable if a∗ > 3√v∗, which is roughly equivalent to (a∗)2 > 10v∗,
which in turn can be rewritten as
2αNω2
µ
> 10
(
var δ
δ
2 + 1− ω2
)
.
The strongest clique comprising N1 individuals; other N2 = N − N1 individuals belong to weaker
cliques. We assume that all N1 individuals in the clique are close allies that always help each other and never
help outsiders. To evaluate the expected average over the clique 〈ε〉, we need to find the expected value of ∆ = εij
for a random pair from the strongest clique. One needs to consider five possibilities:
• With probability 1/(N2 ), the focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict. In this case, ∆ = δ0.
• With probability 2(N1 − 2)ω/
(
N
2
)
, one of the focal individuals is an initiator of a conflict involving another
member of the clique while the other is aware of the conflict and interferes on behalf of one side. In this
case, ∆ = δ.
• With probability
[(
N1−2
2
)
/
(
N
2
)]
ω2, both focal individuals are aware of and interfere in a conflict between
two other members of the clique. In this case, ∆ = δ.
• With probability
[
2N2/
(
N
2
)]
ω, one of the focal individuals is an initiator of a conflict involving an outsider
while the other is aware of the conflict and interferes on behalf of the clique member. Assuming that the
clique always wins, ∆ = δWW .
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• With probability
[
(N1 − 2)N2/
(
N
2
)]
ω2, both focal individuals are aware of and interfere in a conflict be-
tween a member of the clique and an outsider. Assuming that the clique always wins, ∆ = δWW .
Therefore,
〈ε〉 = 1(
N
2
)δ0 + 2(N1 − 2)(N
2
) ωδ +
(
N1−2
2
)
(
N
2
) ω2δ + 2N2(
N
2
)ωδWW + (N1 − 2)N2(N
2
) ω2δWW . (S11)
Assume that N1 = N − 1, N2 = 1 (i.e., the single outsider case). Then the dynamics of the average within-clique
affinity a are described by equation
da
dt
= αN
[
1(
N
2
)δ0 + 2(N − 3)(N
2
) ωδ +
(
N−3
2
)
(
N
2
) ω2δ + 2(
N
2
)ωδWW + (N − 3)(N
2
) ω2δWW
]
− µa.
Thus, the average affinity under the single outsider regime is predicted to evolve to
a∗s =
αN
µ
[
ω2 δ − 6(N − 2)
N(N − 1)ω
2 δ +
2(N − 3)
N(N − 1)
(
2ωδ + ω2δWW
)
+
2
N(N − 1)(δ0 + 2ωδww)
]
.
Keeping only terms of order O(1/N) and larger in the brackets,
a∗s =
αN
µ
[
ω2 δ +
4
N
ω(1− ω)δ + 2
N
ω2(δWW − δ)
]
(S12)
It is illuminating to compare this expression with expression (S4) approximating the average affinity under egali-
tarian regime. Under the same assumptions, expression (S4) simplifies to
a∗ =
αN
µ
[
ω2 δ +
4
N
ω(1− ω)δ
]
. (S13)
If N is not too large, a∗ can be substantially smaller than a∗s . It is in this situation when a single outsider can
have a strong stabilizing effect on a small coalition. For example, let α = 1, N = 20, ω = 0.5, µ = 0.05 and
δWW = 1, δLL = 0.5, δLW = −0.5, δWL = −0.5 so that δ = 0.125. Then a∗ = 15.00 but a∗s = 23.75, so that a
single outsider significantly increases the average affinity of the clique. A single outsider will also reduce variance
v, the effect of which will further strengthen the stability of the coalition.
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